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I. Introduction and paper description 
Introduction 
This paper is an intermediate output of an empirical research aiming at the 
construction of an indicator of sustainability for Venezuela: oil based, open and small 
economy. Sustainability is defined as a non-negative and non-declining capital per 
capita where capital includes not only manufactured but also natural and human 
capital. (Dasgupta and Mäler, 2000 and Mäler 2001) The calculation of the index 
requires numerical information of the country’s total capital and its changes. 
The Venezuela’s national accounting system records the annual formation of 
capital but the concept of capital is restricted to manufactured
1 as is the current 
practice in most countries. Measures of total capital are not reported. Consequently, 
the task of estimating the sustainability index implies measurement of quantity and 
value of other kinds of capital: natural and human. Which new form of capital should 
one add first? Due to the primordial role that oil production has had in the Venezuelan 
economy (see table 1) it was obvious that one must start by adding the oil capital, as 
the key element of the natural capital the country possesses. 
The first part of the paper (section II) includes the definition of oil capital as 
the oil proven reserves. It includes also the estimates of the oil capital volume, and an 
analysis of driving forces for the changes in the volume of proven reserves that 
occurred during the studied period (1960 – 2000). It is argued that changes in the 
property right regime of the oil industry played a decisive role in the changes of the   3
oil capital. The second part (section III) reports on the valuation issues. The value of 
the stock of oil capital and its changes are defined. The way to calculate those values 
depends on the assumptions made about the discovery function and the allocation 
mechanisms. In the section are presented the results for calculations made under 
different sets of assumptions. It is shown that the value of the oil capital may be very 
different depending on the set of assumptions chosen. For the Venezuelan case it is 
argued that the value of the oil capital has increased faster than the population, during 
the studied period, which is the result obtained when accepting the following two 
assumptions: a) Venezuela is a price taker in the oil market; and b) the exploration 
costs do not measure the value of the additions but the oil contribution to human 
capital. And section V is a concluding section where some of the limitations of the 
study are presented and discussed. 
Table 1 
Indicators of the role of Oil in the Venezuelan economy 
    
Oil  share  of    GDP   X   FI 
 
  1965     27   91   65 
  1970     22   90   61 
  1975     30   91   77 
  1980     29   92   72 
  1990     28   75   77 
1995     17   67   45 
 2000     23   78   50 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
X: Exports 
FI: Fiscal Income 
 
 
Source: MEM (Venezuela) 
II. Oil capital, physical accounts and analysis of the changes 
II.1 Definition of oil capital 
Oil resources are classified according to the degree of geological certainty and 
the technological and economic viability. Proven reserves are that part of the oil   4
resources that are known with considerable geological certainty and that can be 
recovered under the current economic and technological conditions (see Annexe 1, at 
the end of the paper). Oil capital is defined as the amount of proven reserves, because 
they are the amount of oil resources that have rental value. Although it is to 
acknowledge that other Venezuelan oil resources may have a positive market value 
(option value) but the magnitude of them are unknown. Better information on this 
matter would eventually increase the estimates presented here. 
II.2 Proven Reserves Volume 
The changes in the volume of proven reserves ( OK S ∆ ) are the result of the 
combined effect of two forces: additions (see section II.4) and depletion.  
   t t t t OK Depletion    -   Additions        Reserves Proven        = ∆ = ∆ S  (1) 
Figure 1 
Venezuelan Proven Reserves  
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Source: MEM. PODE. Selected years 
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II.3  The changes in the volume of the proven reserves 
The Venezuelan proven reserves increased during the studied period at an 
annual average rate of 5%. Their increase did not happen evenly over that period 
(table 2). In the sixties the proven reserves went slightly down, and from 1972 they 
started to increase in a sustained path. However is in 1986 when the reserves jumped 
so as to double in size and thereafter they kept slowly increasing all the time with a 
moderate rate. Why? 
Table 2 
      Proven reserves growth rate 
 
In the 60’s       -1,31 
In the 70’s        4,07 
In the 80’s      15,64 
In the 90’s        2,85 
 
1960 – 2000        5,10 
 
    Source: MEM. PODE. Selected years 
II.4  The analysis of the additions 
1. Additions may occur for three reasons, namely: Discoveries, Extensions and 
Revisions.  
    Additions = Discoveries + Extensions + Revisions    (2) 
Discoveries are those proven reserves that exploratory drilling finds in new oil fields 
or in new reservoirs in oil fields. That is new oil resulting from successful exploration 
activities. Extensions are increases in proven reserves because of subsequent drilling 
showing that discovered reservoirs are larger than originally estimated. They are also 
new oil but resulting from increasing levels of certainty. Revisions are changes in 
proven reserves because oil firms acquire new information on markets conditions or 
new technologies.    6
Figure 2 shows the changes in the additions and one can see the source of the 
change. Most of the additions were revisions, that is, according to the definitions it 
must be the result of changes in market conditions. 
II.5    Property rights modifications as a driving force of the changes in the 
proven reserves  
The proven reserves of oil may increase when the prices do because some of 
the oil resources that were not included in the proven reserves acquire rental value.  
    Figure 2 












Source: MEM. PODE. Selected years   7
 
In the Venezuelan case the reserves increased when the prices did but they 
also rose when the prices fell. Why? 
Venezuela became the world biggest oil export country in 1928, when its 
exports started to be greater than those from Mexico. The legal status of oil has 
always been that it belongs to the state, as all subsoil resources do according to laws 
inherited from colonial times. However the oil industry was in the hands of foreign 
companies that had received concessions.  
Main changes in the property right system occurred during the time period of 
this study. In 1958 the last dictatorial government came to an end and the Venezuela’s 
democratic period started then. Venezuela implemented at that time a new oil policy 
based on: a) no new concessions, b) the creation of a state oil company, c) the 
promotion of a producers union which led to the creation of OPEC, d) the 
introduction of changes in the royalties and the tax system in order to favour the 
nation’s recovery of the oil rents, and e) the creation of a state owned oil company. To 
that is to be added that the major concessions were to revert to the country in 1983-
1984. 
No new concessions, an increased participation of the state in the rents and in 
the business, and decreasing prices –together with the relatively short time remaining 
before the existing concessions will revert- were strong negative incentives for the 
foreign companies. The capital investments in the end of the sixties had decreased in 
about 20%, and the oil employment fell to its half (Espinasa, 1997). Meanwhile the 
production went up reaching its maximum in 1970 (see figure 3). After 1970 the oil 
production declined because of the exhaustion of the old fields. That is the oil   8
production started its fall much before OPEC decided to cut it back. The volume 
produced fell precisely when the price started to increase. 
Figure 3 
 

































































































Source: MEM. PODE. Selected years 
 
The new oil policy had increased the participation of the state in the oil 
revenues and simultaneously had created negative incentives for the oil companies; 
meanwhile the oil reserves from Arabic countries were rising. All these elements led 
to the fact that Venezuela kept its position as biggest exporter until 1970 when Saudi 
Arabia took over, while the relation reserves/production went down to 10.  
In 1973, the international oil companies and the Venezuelan government 
agreed not to wait until the concession will revert to the state. The industry was 
nationalized in 1975. The new state oil company –PDV– started operations (1976) 
and a massive investment plan was carried out. In what affects the amount of reserves,   9
the new investment policy led first to stop the field’s decay and later to increases in 
reserves (Espinasa, 1998).  
Simultaneously, resources were allocated also to technology development for 
the very heavy oil that had been found in the Orinoco belt. Orimulsión –the patented 
name - is a liquid combustible produced with this new technology, and it is used as an 
alternative input in electrical plants. 
As a consequence, the proven reserves went up from 18 thousand million 
barrels 1976 (when the nationalization happened) to near 80 thousands million barrels 
today
2.  
In the Figure 4 can be seen that when the oil prices jumped in the 70s, the 
reserves did not jump as much as they did in mid 80s. They increased in the 80s, with 
a big jump in 86, when the Orinoco belt resources started to be included in the proven 
reserves, and they continued to increase moderately even when the prices fell. The 
changes in reserves are more related to the changes in the property right system than 
to the changes in prices. 
The property right regime had gone through major changes. That is not to say 
that changes in prices did not change the volume of reserves, they did; and the OPEC 
quota policy may also have given incentive to increases in the volume of the reserves 
– as quotas are related to the amount of reserves – but the main jump in reserves is 
more the consequence of changes in the property right system. Those changes created 
the incentives for exploration and technology development and for the search of 
markets to the extra heavy oil. These major changes in the property rights regime 
have also had other consequences that are not in focus here because they are not 
directly related to the reserves but to the fiscal revenues and in a more general way to 
the relations between the national oil industry and the rest of the economy.    10
 
Figure 4 
Reserves and price trends 





















Source: MEM. PODE. Selected years 
 
 
II.6   The proven reserves increased but they changed in quality 
 
The additions were mainly of heavy and extra heavy oil meanwhile the production 
was integrated mainly with light and medium oil (see figure 5 and 6). The corollary?  
The participation of heavy and extra heavy oil in the Venezuelan reserves of oil has 
increased. 
   11
 
Figure 5 
Venezuelan Proven Reserve Structure by grades API 
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   Source: MEM. PODE. Selected years 
 
Figure 6 
    Source: MEM. PODE. Selected years 
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Light and Medium Heavy and Extra heavy  12
III. Valuation of the oil capital  
III.1 Definition 
The value of oil capital in year t  (WOK t) is defined as the shadow price of oil 
(pt) times the amount of proven reserves (St); and the shadow price is defined as the 
change in well-being
3 (Vt) derived from a unit change in the stock of oil (St) (see 
Dasgupta and Mäler 2000 and Mäler 2001) 
W OK t = p t * S OK t       (3) 







=         (4) 
 
However the shadow price, defined as above, is not available for the moment 
and its calculation is very difficult. Instead the international net average price of the 
Venezuelan oil exports is used in the paper. That introduces other bias in the 
calculations of the value, which will be discussed in section V.  The value of the oil 
capital is calculated here as the international average market price for the Venezuelan 
oil, net of production costs, times the quantity of proven reserves.  
P t  = average oil world market price per barrel – average cost per barrel  (5)
 W OK t =  P t * S t  
Two issues remain to be discussed in this section. 1) The changes in the stock 
of oil (S) are a function of production, discoveries and exploration costs. Explorations 
costs have been used as the value of discoveries (UN, 1983). How should we treat 
them when valuing oil capital? 2) The fluctuations in oil prices are notorious. Changes 
in prices lead to capital gain or losses. How should one account for capital gains (or 
losses)?   13
In other words, which assumptions may one make about the discovery function 
and the autonomy of the oil allocation mechanisms?  
•  The discovery function  
1.  Are today’s discoveries the consequence of only today’s exploration 
costs? Or, 
2.  Are they today’s discoveries the consequence of only the accumulated 
exploration costs? 
•  The resource mechanism allocations. 
a.  Are the oil allocation mechanisms autonomous? Or, 
b.  Are they non-autonomous? 
The remaining part of this section focuses in these issues. It is shown that the value of 
the oil capital varies significantly depending on assumptions made.  
III.2 Exploration  costs 
In current national accounting systems has been accepted that discoveries 
should not be treated as an expense but as an investment, and therefore they must be 
incorporated as part of the year capital formation of the country. The explanation has 
been that exploration costs are a measure of the potential discoveries of oil. The oil 
capital values are to be used for adjusting the current measures of capital in the search 
of a more inclusive definition of the country’s wealth. If when oil capital value is 
measured one includes the value of the oil discovered, then one can believe that there 
is double accounting. Is that true? Dasgupta, Kriström, Mäler (1997) developed a 
model with which they proved that if one assumes that oil resources discovered today 
depend only on the accumulated exploration costs then they should not be a measure 
of the discoveries value but instead a contribution of oil to the formation of human 
capital (knowledge). The value of the change in oil capital must be measured by the   14
result of the two forces that modified the stock, additions minus depletion. In other 
words, both the exploration costs and the value of the discoveries must be accounted 
for in the year capital formation.  
In the other hand, if the discoveries of this year are the consequence of the 
exploration cost of the year, exploration cost can not be considered oil contribution to 
human capital and both addition and exploration costs can not be added but only one 
of them. 
III.3  Allocation mechanism of oil resources 
This section is done following Mäler (2001) in which the author develops a 
model for measuring wealth in discrete time, for the proof of what follows the reader 
may look at that reference.  
If the economy’s allocation mechanisms
4 are time autonomous
5, one can 
express in discrete time the change in social well-being as follows  
   ) ( 1 1 t t t t t K K p V V − = − + +      (7) 
In equation 7, V stands for social well-being, p for shadow price (defined 
above as the change in well-being when the resource stock changes in one unit), K 
stands for the inclusive definition of capital, and t for the time period. That is, the 
change in well-being is equal to the value of the change in the capital stock. The value 
of the change in capital is different from the change in the value of the capital because 
it excludes capital gains. 
The assumption of time autonomous mechanisms in the allocation of oil 
resources implies that the capital gains must be excluded. 
However, resource mechanism allocations may be non-autonomous. They are 
non-autonomous when exogenous changes influence the economy and the way this   15
economy’s resources are allocated also changes. For example, changes in the terms of 
trade.  
When the allocation mechanisms are non-autonomous the change in well-
being will be 
   t t t t t t R p S p V V − = − + ε 1      (8) 
R is the production and ε  is the average annual relative change in the world 
market price. The world market price of the produced oil is in general different to the 
accounting price of the stock. In the calculations made here they are assumed to be the 
same and that introduces a bias in the calculations as it was mentioned in section III.1.  
Mäler concludes that the capital gains generated by price changes in the world 
market should be included when assessing the change in well-being but no those 
being the consequence of changes in the accounting price 
III.4  Measuring the value of oil capital under different assumptions 
III.4.1  Estimate 1 
Here is presented the value of oil capital when one accepts the following 
assumptions: 
Assumption 1.The discoveries reported this year depends only on this year 
explorations costs and not in the previous years exploration cost. 
Assumption 2 The resource allocation mechanisms for oil resources are 
exogenous 
In this case, the value of the oil capital 
•  Will not include the value of the discoveries 
•  The oil capital for the starting year is calculated as p0S0; and, 
•   To this initial value of the stock one deducts every year the oil production.   16
 W  OK t = W OK t-1 – (pt * Dt  )     (9) 
In figure 7 it is shown the value of the oil capital for the period 1960-2000 
when it is measured following this set of assumptions. The average annual growth rate 
for this estimate is near to minus 7% (see table 3, in page 19)  
Figure 7 
Value of the Venezuela’s oil capital 
Estimate 1 (million Bs 84)
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This estimate may lead us to the conclusion that the country is depleting the 
oil resources without any compensation and may adjust down the estimations of total 
capital formation 
The United Nations recommendation how to account for mineral reserves 
included in the guidelines published in 1993, correspond to this case. According to 
those recommendations, capital gains are to be included and the discoveries are 
valued by the exploration costs. (United Nations 1993, in particular pages 219, 230).  
The World Bank produces and publishes the genuine saving indicator, which 
is meant to cope with the absence of other capitals different to the real, within the   17
current accounting system. Genuine saving includes traditional savings less de value 
of resource depletion and environmental degradation plus de value of investments in 
human capital (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999) 
That means that both United Nations and the World Bank are using this way 
for valuing an asset.  
III.4.2 Estimate 2 
Now both previous assumptions are changed and instead the following ones 
are accepted 
Assumption 1 The discoveries of proven reserves of oil that the country 
reports in year t depend only on the accumulated exploration costs  
Assumption 2 The resource mechanism allocation is autonomous 
These assumptions together will imply the exclusion of capital gains and the inclusion 
of the discovery value when valuing oil capital.  







+ − + =
t
OK OK OK OK p W W
t
τ
τ τ τ      (10)   
The oil capital in Venezuela has grown at an average annual rate of 10 % with 
this set of assumptions, under the studied period (see table 3 in page 19).  
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Figure 8 
Venezuela’s oil capital value 
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III.4. 3   Estimate 3 
Here WOK is estimated under the following two assumptions:  
Assumption 1: The discoveries of proven reserves of oil that the country 
reports in year t depend only on the exploration costs the companies had in the 
previous years 
Assumption 2: The resource allocation mechanism in the economy is 
exogenous 
The stock of oil capital in period t is given by 
  S OK t = S OK t-1 + A t - D t        (11)   19
S OK t stands for stock of oil proven reserves in year t, A t for the additions made to the 
proven reserves during the year, D t for the oil produced (depleted) during the year t, 
all of them expressed in physical units.  
The value of the oil stock in period t, W OK t, is given by  
W OK t = W OK  t-1  + Pt * (At - D t )     (12) 
In this estimate the value of oil capital includes the value of the net changes to 
proven reserves (Additions minus depletions) and the capital gains generated by 
changes in the world market prices 
The average annual growth of the oil capital, according with this set of assumptions is 
8% (see table 3 in page 19). Notice that during the studied period, the changes in price 
gave in average losses instead of gains. 
This third estimate of the oil value seems to me the one that is closest to the real 
conditions. The oil reserve additions do depend on the accumulated expenses in 
explorations. Venezuela is a price taker, even if the country has had some influence in 
the way OPEC may behave by itself neither Venezuela nor OPEC can fix the price of 
oil. The consequences of the changes in the world market prices are very much 
affecting the well-being of Venezuelan citizens. 
 
   Table 3 
      Oil capital estimates growth rate 
    1960 - 2000 
                   % 
    Estimate 1  (used by WB)   - 6,98 
      Estimate 2  (without cg)      9,40 
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Figure 9 
The three different values of Venezuelan oil capital 
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IV. Population and oil capital growth 
The Venezuelan population grew at an annual average rate of 3% during the 
period 1960 – 2000. The growth rate of a series built with the value of oil capital 
(estimate #3) per capita is a bit larger than 3%. Oil capital has grown at a fastest path 
than population. And that is true also if we made the estimations with the volume of 
oil instead of the value of them.  
V. A review of the biases in the estimations and concluding remarks  
V.1 The  biases 
V.1.1  The concept of oil capital 
Oil resources that are different from the proven reserves are not accounted for. 
By definition, oil capital is the amount of proven reserves a country has, and therefore 
it is the value of the Venezuelan proven reserves what I have estimated as the value of 
oil capital. Other resources, known with less geological certainty, are not included.   21
However those resources may have a positive market value, which should be also 
estimated and included, as Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg (1999) have already pointed 
out. How to measure the value of those other resources needs further work. In the case 
that other resources would have rental value, the measures given in this paper would 
have a bias downward. 
V.1.2  Valuing remaining reserves with the price of oil sold 
I am using the market price and average production costs of the oil sold to 
obtain the net price with which the oil capital is valued. However, in the Venezuelan 
case, the structure of the proven reserves is quite different from the structure of the oil 
being produced, in terms of the oil quality. The Venezuelan reserve composition has 
changed under the studied period (see figures 5 and 6 above). At the end of the period 
the proportion of the heavy and extra heavy oil has increased. These oils, heavy and 
extra heavy, have a smaller market price and a higher cost than the light and 
medium oils. Heavy oil and light oil are different goods and should be valued with 
different net prices. Given the composition of the remaining reserves in Venezuela, 
implies that the value estimated is biased upwards.  
V.1.3 Average  costs 
According to the theory, one should use marginal costs in the estimation of 
the unit rent. Marginal costs are seldom available and I did not have access to them. 
Therefore the accounting price was estimated with average cost. The implication of 
this is a bias downward of the value of the oil capital, as the marginal cost would be 
higher than the average. 
V.1.4 Natural gas is not yet included 
The reported costs for oil are not separated form the cost of producing natural 
gas - a by-product.    22
V.2   Concluding remarks 
Summarizing the findings 
1.  The changes in property right played an important role in the investments on 
exploration and in technology development leading later on to a substantial 
increase in the size of the oil capital 
2.  The volume of proven reserves grew in average at an annual rate of 5%. While 
the population grew at 3% annual average rate (OCEI) 
3.  The oil capital structure has changed to have a much bigger proportion of 
heavy and extra heavy oil at the end of the period 
4.  The estimate #1, which follows UN recommendations and the way the World 
Bank genuine savings indicator is calculated, gives a negative rate for the 
increase in capital. That happens because in this way of doing reserves are 
valued by the exploration costs  
5.  The estimate # 2, in which capital gains are excluded, shows that in the period 
the country had not gains but losses The growth rate for this estimate was 10% 
average per year, while for the estimate # 3 –which includes the capital gains- 
was only 8% 
6.  The three different estimates for the value of the oil capital showed in the 
paper correspond to different assumptions on 
a.  The country allocates its resources autonomously or not 
b. The additions to oil proven reserves were a function of the 
accumulated exploration costs or not 
I argue that the third estimate is the one that follows the theoretical 
principles best, because  
a.  Venezuela is a price taker and    23
b.  The additions made are mainly the consequences of 
the accumulated exploration costs 
7. If one accepts estimate #3 as the best, the oil capital grew fastest than 
population, under the period 
8.  The estimates will improve if 
a.  It is possible to use marginal costs 
b.  It is possible to divide the oil reserves in at least two categories 
separating heavy and extra heavy oil, and if one can find prices and 
marginal costs for every year for these two groups of oils. 
c.  Natural gas is incorporated 
9. Last remark 
One should not conclude anything about sustainability with the information 
gathered until now. It is good news that the oil capital has increased, and even faster 
than population but  
•  Other kinds of capital must be accounted for also  
•  The impact of oil capital in an foreseeable degradation of other capitals, 
for example due to pollution, is not measured and will not because there is 
not information 
The main contribution of this empirical study is to show how big the 
differences of the estimates of oil capital value are, depending on the assumptions 
made on exploration costs and allocation mechanism. These issues have never been 
taken into consideration in previous capital valuations, as far as where our 
information goes. The paper also reveals how changes in the economic environment 
of the producer affect the country’s capital formation and gives and inside about the   24
causes of changes in oil proven reserves, which in general are suspected to be only 
capital gains. 
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Notes 
                                                             
1 Manufactured, manmade, real or physical capital are here considered as synonyms 
2 For a more detailed analysis of the changes in the relations between the oil 
companies and the state first as the collector of the rents and after as owner there is an 
huge literature. Further information on the subject can be found in Ramon Espinasa 
(1997), and Bernad Momer (2002) 
3 The value function – Vt- is defined as the net present value of future utilities. 
 















4 A resource mechanism allocation is the mapping from the initial stock of capital into 
a feasible time paths of consumption. It is a predictor of the future of the economy.  
5 A resource allocation mechanism α  is time autonomous when it doesn not depende 
on absolute time but only in time differences 
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